Short notes on Canadian judgments — what the court held, and why it matters.
The Court reset the framework for the standard of review, establishing a presumption that administrative decisions are reviewed for reasonableness, with correctness reserved for defined categories such as constitutional questions and general questions of law of central importance. It also gave detailed guidance on what makes a decision reasonable.
The Court upheld an interlocutory injunction requiring Google to de-index a company's websites worldwide — not only on its Canadian domain — to prevent ongoing harm from the online sale of goods that misappropriated trade secrets.
The Court reset the framework for the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b), setting presumptive ceilings — 18 months for cases in provincial court and 30 months for cases in superior court — beyond which delay is presumptively unreasonable.
The Court recognised good faith as an organising principle of Canadian contract law and established a duty of honest performance: parties must not lie to, or knowingly mislead, one another about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract.
The Court held that internet users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber information linking their identity to their online activity, so police generally need judicial authorisation to obtain it from an internet service provider.
The Court reaffirmed and strengthened the Gladue principles, holding that sentencing judges must take judicial notice of the history and circumstances of Indigenous peoples and apply the analysis in every case, including for serious offences.
The Court of Appeal recognised a new privacy tort — intrusion upon seclusion — allowing recovery where a defendant intentionally intrudes on another's private affairs in a way a reasonable person would find highly offensive, even without proof of economic loss.
The Court held that hyperlinking to defamatory material is not, by itself, 'publication' of that material for the purposes of defamation law; something more is needed to show the linker adopted or endorsed the content.
The Court restated when a person is “detained” for Charter purposes and set a three-part framework for deciding whether evidence obtained in breach of the Charter should be excluded under section 24(2), focused on the long-term repute of the justice system.
The Court clarified that directors' fiduciary duty runs to the corporation itself, not to any single group of stakeholders. In acting in the best interests of the corporation, directors may weigh the interests of shareholders, creditors, employees and others.
The Court restructured judicial review, reducing the standards of review to two — correctness and reasonableness — and setting out when each applies. Its framework was later revised in Vavilov.
The Court set out the factors that shape the content of the duty of procedural fairness, held that fairness could require written reasons, and confirmed that discretionary decisions must be exercised reasonably and consistently with the values underlying the power granted.
Interpreting section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, the Court held that judges must pay particular attention to the circumstances of Indigenous offenders when sentencing, considering their background and alternatives to imprisonment.
Asked whether Quebec could secede unilaterally, the Court held it could not, but that a clear majority on a clear question would create a constitutional duty to negotiate. It identified four underlying constitutional principles: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the protection of minorities.
The Court held that omitting sexual orientation from Alberta's human rights legislation violated section 15, and read the ground into the statute as the remedy.
Setting the framework for a custodial parent's proposed relocation with a child, the Court held there is no presumption for or against the move; the sole question is the best interests of the child in all the circumstances.
The Court held that spousal support under the Divorce Act is primarily compensatory — recognising the economic advantages and disadvantages to each spouse arising from the marriage and its breakdown — rather than being aimed only at making a claimant self-sufficient.
The Court held that the Crown has a legal duty to disclose all relevant material to the defence — whether or not it intends to rely on it, and subject only to limited privilege — because disclosure is essential to the right to make full answer and defence.
The Court held that a conviction for murder requires proof of subjective foresight of death. The principles of fundamental justice under section 7 forbid convicting a person of murder without that mental element.
The Court held that expert evidence on the effects of prolonged abuse is admissible, and that self-defence need not require the danger to be strictly imminent in every case — the reasonableness of the accused's perception may be judged in its full context.
The first section 15 case, it held that equality is substantive rather than formal: the guarantee targets discrimination — distinctions that burden individuals on the basis of personal characteristics — and does not reach every legislative distinction. It rejected a 'similarly situated' test.
The Court struck down the Criminal Code's abortion provisions, holding that the requirement to obtain approval from a therapeutic abortion committee violated a woman's right to security of the person under section 7 in a manner not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
The Court set out the test for when a limit on a Charter right can be justified under section 1: the objective must be pressing and substantial, and the means proportionate — rationally connected to the objective, minimally impairing of the right, and proportionate in their overall effect.
The Court struck down the Lord's Day Act as an infringement of freedom of religion under section 2(a). A law's constitutionality turns on both its purpose and its effects, and Charter rights are defined by the interests they protect.
Interpreting section 8 of the Charter, the Court held that a search is unreasonable unless authorised in advance by a neutral arbiter on reasonable and probable grounds. It framed the interest section 8 protects as a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.
Reviewing a labour board's reading of its own statute, the Court held that courts should defer to a tribunal's reasonable interpretation within its expertise, intervening only where the decision was patently unreasonable. An early foundation of deference in Canadian administrative law.
A probationary police officer dismissed without reasons was owed a duty of fairness, even though he could not claim the full protections of natural justice. The Court recognised a general duty of fairness in administrative decision-making, bridging the old divide between “judicial” and “administrative” functions.
The Premier of Quebec was held personally liable for directing the cancellation of a restaurant owner's liquor licence to punish him for posting bail for fellow Jehovah's Witnesses. No public official has unfettered discretion — a power granted for one purpose may not be used for an unrelated one. An early articulation of the rule of law in Canadian public law.
The House of Lords held that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused — the “golden thread” running through the criminal law. Subject to narrow exceptions, no burden rests on an accused to prove innocence.
A consumer who fell ill after drinking ginger beer said to contain a decomposed snail could sue the manufacturer despite having no contract with it. The House of Lords recognised a general duty of care in negligence, framed by the 'neighbour principle': one must take reasonable care to avoid acts likely to injure those one can reasonably foresee being affected.
The House of Lords held that a properly incorporated company is a legal person separate from its shareholders, so the company's debts are its own. The foundation of separate corporate personality and limited liability.
Establishing the rule on remoteness of damages in contract, the court held that recoverable losses are those arising naturally from the breach, or those that were in the reasonable contemplation of both parties at the time the contract was made.